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Abstract
This article engages with the problematic of violence and 
its relationship to conditions of solidarity at a local level 
in the newly democratised nation-state of South Africa. 
It explores this question through the concept of social 
cohesion, which has become a significant part of South 
African discourse over the past decade and has been the 
object of policy concern in the global north since the 1990s. 
More recently the concept of social cohesion has been linked 
to the question of violence through the theory of collective 
efficacy, which sees social cohesion enacted in support of 
the “common good” as functioning as a critical “protective” 
factor against violence. The paper interrogates these 
international and local discourses around social cohesion 
and its relation to violence through an ethnographic 
examination of the empirical conditions of solidarity and 
violence in one township, Khayelitsha, in the Western Cape, 
South Africa. The article reveals the dissonances between 
the material conditions in Khayelitsha, international 
discourses on social cohesion and the South African state’s 
aspirations towards new forms of civic solidarity founded 
on a Constitutionally defined “common good”. Instead 
collective, informal, and sometimes violent forms of social 
order based on communitarian values and practices, 
displace or contest the state’s law and shape forms of 
sociality that offer both extraordinary support and the 
possibility of spectacular violation.
Introduction
This article seeks to understand urban violence in the 
South African context, through an examination of local 
and international engagements with the concepts of social 
cohesion and collective efficacy as forms of solidarity 
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that are seen to have the potential to “protect” (Muggah, 2012: 39) communities against 
violence. Social cohesion is an ambiguous concept but in its current policy incarnation 
is often used as shorthand for the factors “that holds society together” (The Presidency, 
2004: iv). This problematic has in fact been the focus of philosophical and social inquiry 
since the time of Aristotle, Aquinas and Montaigne and in the sociology of Durkheim in 
the 19th century (1893). Collective efficacy seeks to conceptualise how social cohesion 
can prevent violence when it is translated into collective action at the neighbourhood 
level (Sampson et al, 1997).
Historically the greatest levels of concern with social cohesion have been at moments 
of significant change. For example, Durkheim saw the period of industrialisation 
as leading to the breakdown of traditional social relations and social cohesion. 
In the mid-20th century sociologists such as Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that 
higher rates of “delinquency” in particular neighbourhoods were associated with the 
“social disorganisation” created by the impact of urbanisation on traditional social roles 
and kinship networks. Most recently, the contemporary challenges and fragmentation 
associated with globalisation and rapid urbanisation, have precipitated a renewed 
interest in social cohesion as a policy construct from the 1990s. Therefore, intrinsic to 
the concept of social cohesion is a concern with how community can be re-imagined 
and re-constituted in the wake of social change. Thus far, however, there has been 
little theoretical engagement with social cohesion and its relationship to violence in 
the specific conditions of the global south where structural violence sutures everyday 
life. Instead the limited literature that does exist often “tests” rather than interrogates 
existing conceptual frameworks.
Neighbourhood conditions and questions of neighbourhood civility in urban settings 
such as South Africa are significantly different to those found in the global north where 
theories on social cohesion and collective efficacy were initially developed and have 
been most systematically tested. Moreover, in a new democracy such as South Africa 
neighbourhood civility concerns a far more fundamental challenge relating to the 
conditions for the constitution of the democratic nation-state based on horizontal 
ties of affiliation, after decades of violent conflict and division have torn apart 
the social fabric. This remains a deeply complex and fraught task in post-colonial 
societies that are in general endemically heterogeneous. In such environments 
social pluralism may be devalued as a desire to establish national forms of identity 
and statehood takes precedence.
The apocryphal injunction to “love thy neighbour” refers not only to the literal neighbour 
but the “imagined” neighbour in a community of humans. Anderson (1991: 7) has argued 
in relation to the modern nation-state that the nation “is imagined as a community, 
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because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (emphasis added). 
The concept of social cohesion, while often framed in instrumental policy language, 
implicitly invokes this notion of community and grapples with the terms on which it 
may be established at a particular historical and geographic juncture. In South Africa the 
depth of division and inequality remains a profound challenge to any national imaginary 
as envisaged by Anderson. Efforts to instantiate “community” at local and national levels 
founder on both an existential and empirical question of who this community is.
Putnam’s (2000) influential imagining of American community, articulated in his reading 
of the concept of social capital, where neighbours gather together in bowling alleys, card 
clubs and choirs, presents a pastoral hey-day of association that is in deep opposition 
to violence. Nonetheless, the “decline” of such forms of sociality in American society is 
seen as creating the context for various forms of social dis-ease, including violence. In 
South Africa efforts to constitute and imagine social cohesion cannot raise an “ideal” 
bucolic past where community was woven together by middle class forms of sociality 
as in Putnam’s nostalgic rendition of American community. Instead, here the present 
is and must be posed in opposition to the past, as a world that is being created anew, 
utilising raw materials that pre-dated colonialism such as Ubuntu and forms of sociality 
that continued under apartheid such as stokvels, but which need to be intrinsically 
reformulated in the face of the challenges of democratic nation-hood in the 21st century.
In this milieu the state invokes the concept of social cohesion as a rhetorical means to 
“restore” order and extinguish violence, imagining a new social and political body politic 
characterised by care, tenderness, pride, dignity and civic virtue. It struggles to create a 
disjuncture between the violence of the past and an imaginary of “peace” in the present. 
It’s evident inability to achieve a monopoly over the means of violence as citizens 
enact violence at home and in the streets, as well as the states’ own violent excesses in 
incidents such as the Marikana killings1, belie any “peaceful” conception of the national 
or local community. Instead a “violent democracy” (von Holdt, 2014: 589) has emerged 
from the ashes of transition, melding old and new forms of violence to the conduct of 
local and national politics and social life.
The concept of social cohesion
“Social cohesion” has been called a “quasi-concept” by Bernard (1999), that is, an idea 
that engages with a fundamental social question that has been the focus of sustained 
intellectual enquiry, but which is articulated as a policy construct in vague enough terms 
1 The Marikana killings refers to the death of 34 mine workers who were shot with live ammunition by police after a strike at a
 platinum mine owned by Lonmin in Marikana, Rustenburg, in August 2012.
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to be attached to shifting political projects. A review of Canadian and European policy 
documents on social cohesion identified the concept as referring to a multiplicity of 
concerns including: (1) the sharing of common values, feelings of belonging; (2) economic 
inclusion and opportunities to participate in the labour market; (3) participation in public 
affairs, local and national; (4) tolerance of differences and diversity; and (5) legitimacy of 
institutions, in particular how well they are able to represent citizens & mediate conflict 
(Jenson 1998; Bernard 1999). 
This malleability can be seen in the ongoing international reiterations of the concept 
linked to changing conceptions of the nature of challenges to global and national 
social order and fluctuating political imperatives in different contexts. The value-driven 
emphasis of early social cohesion policy has now been melded to current articulations 
that emphasise the social inclusion of “free individuals” in a market economy.
As a result of the environment in which it emerged, (the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the World Bank 
and the Canadian Federal government), the leading policy work on social cohesion 
has occurred in countries in the global north and is inevitably shaped by the historical 
trajectories, forms of governance and social relations particular to these locations. Thus, 
most international social cohesion policy utilises the concept to understand how to 
integrate all members of the national community into a well-established and relatively 
cohesive democratic nation-state in response to a perceived “decline” in social cohesion. 
South Africa is one of a number of countries in the global south that have incorporated 
such “external” notions of social cohesion into their national policy.
However, South Africa faces an originary struggle: How to establish a socially unified 
democratic nation-state in the first place in an international setting that ostensibly 
challenges the integrity of the nation-state. Confronted by difficulties arising out of its 
complex – and quite different – history and forms of association, it is utilising conceptual 
approaches to national identification, political and social participation and diversity 
developed in response to the complications of social solidarity in long-established 
democratic nation-states. The empirical research on social cohesion has been 
dominated by attempts to conclusively define (Berger-Schmitt 2002; Chan, To & Chan, 
2006; Brisson & Usher 2007; Jensen 2010) and “operationalise” this elusive substance 
or “glue” (World Bank, 1998) into measureable parts that can be quantified in order 
to assess the “amounts” that exist in society. These approaches break the concept of 
social cohesion into different domains that attempt to capture the salient features of 
the “social”. Most of the projects that attempt to quantify social cohesion, build on the 
dimensions identified in Jensen’s typology, although the way in which these aspects are 
framed, and the indicators identified, differ.
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The vast majority of this quantification work has taken place in the global north in 
locations such as Canada, Europe and the United States where extensive sets of survey 
data are available. As a result many indicators used to “measure” social solidarity are 
currently premised on notions of “civic-ness”, “neighbourliness” and “moral community” 
that characterise the relatively orderly conditions of society in North America and 
Western Europe, rather than the far more tenuous conditions of local and national unity 
in countries such as South Africa. Here, the most basic legitimacy of state institutions is 
at stake, participation may involve immediate defence of life, a sense of national or even 
local belonging remains intensely problematic and social inequality is so pervasive that 
trust is deeply undermined. From this perspective, the very meaning of the dimensions of 
social cohesion that current research attempts to measure may be profoundly different 
in the global south.
In addition, the literature on social cohesion has been moulded by particular theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of social solidarity and social life. Durkheim’s teleological 
arguments that as societies modernise, they move from communitarian forms of 
solidarity to solidarity built around relationships between autonomous individuals, 
have been particularly influential. Sampson et al’s (1997: 918) hypothesis of collective 
efficacy, that is now widely used in criminological theory, which he defines as “social 
cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf 
of the ‘common good’” used data from Chicago in the United States and envisages 
individualised, independent subjects “choosing” to come together for the good of a 
particular community. Yet, in environments such as South Africa where communitarian 
social relations and identities are still prevalent, such forms of mutual social 
interaction are an assumed part of social life rather than an individual “choice” in the 
manner envisaged in Western contractarian thought. As an interviewee in Khayelitsha 
explained, “individualism is in the head it is not in the blood” (Interview report, parent, 
Ncedo Mngqibisa, Khayelitsha, March 2014). In Sampson et al’s account, the differential 
ability of neighbourhoods to prevent violence and achieve social control through 
informal mechanisms is premised on their ability to realise the “common values” of a 
neighbourhood. The willingness to intervene for the “common good” is premised on the 
existence of trust and solidarity between neighbours. Social control is evaluated in terms 
of supervision of children in a particular neighbourhood and general issues of order 
conceptualised as a willingness to confront “persons who are exploiting or disturbing 
public space” (Sampson et al, 1997: 918).
At the centre of the notion of the “common good” in Western traditions is the idea 
that the individual and the common good are indivisible but not commensurable. One 
cannot be realised without the other but neither can they be reduced to the other. Thus 
the individual good can only be realised through society but this does not mean that the 
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common good is simply an aggregation of the individual good as in contractarian theory 
where society is a “rational project” (Argandoña, 2011: 6) of individual choice. Solidarity 
between subjects is indispensable to the common good not only in instrumental terms 
but because the ontological human state is essentially social. The Catholic Church, one 
of the key contemporary Western theorists of the concept of the common good argues 
that “relationality is an essential element” of the “humanum” (The Encyclical Caritas 
Veritate, Benedict XV1, 2009 cited in Argandoña, 2011: 2).
These conceptions of the common good are deeply affiliated with the ethics of Ubuntu 
that both implicitly and explicitly structure social life and identity in environments such 
as South Africa. In terms of this ethics, which is part of the “unconscious hereditary 
wisdom” (Maritain, 1966: 10) of most South Africans, ethical personhood, as opposed 
to mere existence, is realised through the collective and by means of actively carrying 
out duties and obligations to kin and community. Thus, “[i]t is the carrying out of these 
obligations that transforms one from the it-status of early child-hood, marked by an 
absence of moral function, into the person-status of later years” (Menkiti, 1984: 176). And 
so, in this context the entire notion of ethics is founded on the concept of community. 
Ethics are not only understood in terms of transcendent norms but in terms of the good 
of the collective: “The right builds up society; the wrong tears it down. One is social; 
the other anti-social” (McVeigh, 1974: 84). Therefore, the relationality of human beings 
prescribes a social rather than purely individual ethic.
However, the nature of the “common good” as reflected in Sampson’s account is deeply 
disputed. For example, at a national level, recent surveys in South Africa indicate that there 
remain deep divisions between white and black South Africans about the need for redress 
with only 3 in 10 of white South Africans believing that apartheid resulted in the poverty of 
black South Africans (cf Wales, 2014). Contrary to the state’s aspirations towards a nation 
founded on civic norms and identification with a South African nation-state, a recent 
survey indicates that over time, “the desire for a united South Africa has decreased 
by 17.9% from 72.9% in 2003 to 55% in 2013” (Wales, 2014: 15). Instead the top four 
identity associations chosen by South Africans between 2003 and 2013 are language, 
race, ethnicity and lastly a South African identity. However, primary identification with 
a South African identity dropped from 11.2% in 2003 to 7.1% in 2013 (cf Wales, 2014).
These fractures play out at a local level in terms of even more parochial identities. What 
is the common good in the neighbourhood setting in South Africa and how do citizens 
attempt to enact it? What types of intersubjectivity underpin it? Sen argues that the 
common good relates to the need to create the conditions necessary for each individual 
“to achieve those ends that each has reason to value” (in Woolman, 2013: 24) rather 
than attempting to prescribe a universal understanding of the common good. For Sen 
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individuals need the material and immaterial support (cf Woolman, 2013) to achieve a 
meaningful vision of the good as they understand it. However, the South African state 
sees the common good as directly related to collective action by state and society to 
achieve the common good of transformation (Hudson, 2000). Its understanding of the 
common good tends to be normative and focuses on consensus in the realm of values. 
What happens, however, when the state’s vision of the common good is contested, when 
its law and its norms may be refuted and the ends that “each has reason to value” may 
conflict in insurmountable terms?
South African policy discourse on social cohesion
The concept of social cohesion has been the subject of prodigious policy work in the 
South African context since 2004. Shifting inflections reflect the ongoing integration 
of the concept into state discourse and its alignment to key national political and 
developmental projects. While the reasons for concerns with social cohesion appear 
obvious in as divided a society as South Africa, the focus on cohesion can also be a 
dangerous obfuscation that fails to deal with the fundamental antagonisms in society 
in favour of a “culturalisation of politics” in which political and economic difference are 
neutralised into cultural difference (Nkondo, 2015). Nkondo (2015: 1) asks: “Why are 
so many challenges in post-apartheid South Africa perceived as challenges of social 
cohesion, rather than as challenges of inequality, exploitation or enduring injustice? 
Why are the proposed remedies reconciliation and tolerance, rather than liberation and 
political struggle?”
Thus, while many policy documents on social cohesion rhetorically acknowledge the 
structural deprivation that is associated with the fragmentation of society, they posit 
consensus in the realm of values as one of the most significant responses. This consensus 
will form the basis for a national imaginary that will “overcome” the deep divisions 
in the country. Policy emphasises “consensus”, “coherence”, “unity”, “functionality”, 
“cooperation”, “social integration” and “solidarity”. The concept of social cohesion has 
been explicitly linked to the objectives of the developmental state and the articulation 
of a need for a “social compact” (The Presidency, 2008: 123) to rally all sectors of society 
together around a common national vision of transformation despite the potential of 
uncomfortable “trade-offs” (The Presidency, 2008: 2). The county’s National Development 
Plan, the major formal strategic framework for government action, articulates its vision 
of social cohesion and nation building as founded on the Constitution and rule of law, 
which will putatively create the basis for “a new South African identity” (The Presidency, 
2011a: 422). The plan sees these as providing the fundamental normative framework for 
society and a conclusive vision of “the good”. It advocates the Constitution as “general 
guides to behaviour”, “enduring beliefs about what is worthwhile” and “broad standards 
by which particular acts are judged to be good, right …” (The Presidency, 2011a: 422).
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In 2012 policy making around social cohesion culminated with the launch of a social 
cohesion strategy by the Department of Arts and Culture. This policy document seeks 
to meld two contradictory impulses, on the one hand asserting its essential “South 
African-ness”, expressed in terms of the ethics of Ubuntu, which “articulates a social 
humanism of interpersonal care, sharing and a commitment to the greater social good” 
(Department of Arts and Culture, 2012: 6). On the other hand, the document strongly 
emphasises a vision of a socially cohesive nation-state founded on a common South African 
identity based on “citizenship” and “civic nationalism”, which is opposed to the ethno-
nationalism of the apartheid state. In this civic nation citizens conduct towards each 
other and their identity is to be shaped by “democratic norms and values” (Department 
of Arts and Culture, 2012: 12). Civic nationalism founds solidarity on “rational secular 
values” and includes all those who subscribe to a nation’s political creed (Ignatieff, 1993: 
6). While civic nationalism is not a-cultural in the sense that it is also conceptualised 
as being constituted by common memories and histories, the legal and juridical are 
a significant component of national identity. It evokes Habermas’ (1998) conception 
of “constitutional patriotism” in which he envisions a nation-hood founded solely on 
the citizenry’s commitment to political and institutional principles such as democratic 
values and human rights.
Khayelitsha: A case study
Methods
In order to interrogate international and local discourses on the relationship between 
violence and social cohesion the study integrated both ethnographic and grounded 
theory approaches. Ethnography seeks to interpret the meanings located in particular 
social and cultural systems in order to develop a picture of the overall “way of life” 
(Goodenough, 1976: 5) of a specific community. It investigates how social relations and 
cohesion are understood – and produced – by social actors themselves. This research 
was therefore concerned to understand the way in which solidarity was imagined by 
social actors in terms of shared “webs of significance” (Geertz, 1973: 5) or perceptions 
of “reality” that make social relationships possible. Drawing on a grounded theory 
approach, the analysis focused on particular processes or phenomenon rather than a 
descriptive overview of the entire universe of social relations in Khayelitsha (cf Charmaz, 
2006). It concentrated on those forms of relations and practices that were specifically 
relevant to an understanding of social solidarity and its relation to violence. 
In addition, the methodology saw the space of Khayelitsha and the way it is 
constituted within relations of solidarity and disjuncture as critically important 
to understanding and questioning formal discourses and theoretical elaborations 
around social cohesion. The investigation sought to understand how social relations 
are embodied in particular spaces rather than simply conceiving of them as free 
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floating social processes (cf Lefebvre, 1991). Hence, residents didn’t practice and 
imagine social solidarity in the abstract but realised and constituted this solidarity in 
geographical space, imagined in relation to “other” neighbourhoods in Khayelitsha, in 
relation to Khayelitsha as a township in South Africa and in relation to the globe as a 
whole. Within this context the ethnographic and grounded theory methodologies were 
seen as complementary strategies. The ethnography allowed for the inductive discovery 
of relationships that had not been identified or elaborated in current theoretical 
formulations of social cohesion (cf Wilson & Chadda, 2010). Subsequently the analysis 
of interview and focus group material utilised the “open coding” approach advocated 
in grounded theory methodology in order to discover emergent meaning from the data 
and develop “codes” to describe and analyse the transcripts, rather than seeking to 
impose pre-defined categories onto the information. At the same time the research was 
clearly iterative. No researcher goes into the field without being informed by certain 
ideas, concepts and theories (O’Reilly, 2012). Nevertheless, these concepts and theories 
were “played against systematically gathered data” (Strauss, 1994: 277) in a continuous 
“conversation” (ibid: 280) between extant theory and newly collected data.
The fieldwork was carried out by research team member Ncedo Mngqibisa, who immersed 
himself in the communities living in the Harare and Kuyasa sections of Khayelitsha. He 
conducted daily field visits that allowed him to produce a “thick description” (Geertz, 
1973) of the “way of being” (Fetterman, 2010: 65) of these communities through 
interviews, focus groups, informal conversations and ongoing systematic observations. 
Recordings of a total of 58 interviews and six focus groups were translated into English 
by a professional translator, combined with Mngqibisa’s field notes and commentary 
on the key research issues of the study. Mngqibisa’s role as an isiXhosa speaker and 
researcher was crucial in not only collecting data and negotiating the complexities of the 
Khayelitsha environment but also interpreting this context and analysing the material.
Khayelitsha the township
What are the empirical grounds of solidarity in Khayelitsha and how do they relate both 
to global conceptions of social cohesion and collective efficacy and the South African 
state’s own imagination of a society founded on democratic norms? Can one talk of 
a common social imaginary, of the nation or the neighbourhood? What emerges in 
Khayelitsha is a deeply fractured account of this space and subjective interpretation 
of the post-apartheid condition in this context. Articulated in the voices of residents 
of different genders, generations, class positions and national identity are multiple 
representations of the structural conditions of space and life in the township. In 
many ways, apartheid redefined the notion of the neighbourhood as a space of local 
conviviality. Instead it created spaces (or attempted to) that were like the camp. 
Townships were constituted as functional spaces for labour – without recreation, or 
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formal social and economic relations, where people could rest just enough to enable 
them to carry out their instrumental labour function. This was Marx’s notion of alienation 
writ large. Khayelitsha was one of the last townships established under this regime of 
separation and was intended to forcibly “consolidate” the settlement of black people in 
the urban areas of the Western Cape. This is the history in which the spectacular violence 
that occurs in Khayelitsha needs to be located. However, while the apartheid state tried 
to create spaces such as Khayelitsha as places of abjection and surveillance, they were 
never just this apartheid imaginary. How different and similar are conditions now?
While residents have the formal rights of citizenship they struggle to realise and make 
real this promise of citizenship. They face structural deprivation (few of those who are 
employed earn above R2 000 per month) and extraordinary violence (the murder rate is 
up to 36 times the global average). Nevertheless, what happens in Khayelitsha is not a 
space of exception and pathology but helps create the conditions of possibility for the 
“peace” of the “white” city of Cape Town by containing violence and poverty outside 
it, in an “elsewhere” (cf Gillespie, 2014). Although the empirical conditions of violence 
and poverty in Khayelitsha are indisputable, the way in which these conditions are 
constituted and shaped through social imagination and individual subjectivity realised 
in space, is critical to understanding the fractured nature of Khayelitsha township as 
part of the post-apartheid order. As Lefebvre has argued a geographical space such as 
Khayelitsha is not an a priori reality. Instead space is a “social product” in which social 
relations are embodied and enacted. This social space is reproduced through “spatial 
practice” – concrete social activity and interaction in space (cf Pieterse, 2011) that 
“ensures continuity and some degree of cohesion” (Lefebvre, 1991: 33). Representations 
of space or the “symbolic associations we link with particular kinds of spaces” (Pieterse, 
2011: 12) and “representational spaces” i.e. the symbolic order of life, are according 
to Lefebvre, tied to the production of social order in a particular society and historical 
period. However, these spaces always escape totalising forms of power, creating the 
possibility for agency and multiplicity.
Thus space is crucial to the manner in which we imagine and constitute our common 
world. Anderson’s (1983) conception of the way in which the modern nation-state has 
historically been reproduced as an “imagined” common space has been critical to 
understanding the constitution of the nation-state as this unfolded in Western, if not 
postcolonial, modernity. A number of writers have articulated the notion of “social 
imaginary” as the symbolic dimension though which we imagine our collective life. For 
Appadurai (1990 & 1996) in late modernity the social imaginary has become a global 
social practice, which both produces and constrains agency and has generated new 
images of human possibility and new ideals of human solidarity. Taylor emphasises 
that the social imaginary is not merely a set of abstract ideas but is the “background” 
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that makes social existence possible through collectively represented and individually 
conceived understandings of a social and normative order i.e. how “things should go” 
and “how we all fit together” (Taylor, 2002: 18).
How do the residents of Khayelitsha imagine the community in which they are 
located, the social order inscribed in this imagination and their own subjective 
location in this space?
Almost universally, Khayelitsha is imagined and indeed experienced as a place of deep 
violence, a world of almost Hobbesian threat. The geographic space of Khayelitsha 
is conceived of as a series of dangerous inflections, some spaces more violent or less 
violent, some spaces characterised by particular types of violence but ultimately 
violence is seen as constitutive of the space of Khayelitsha. “[T]here is no place that is 
safe in Khayelitsha …. It’s either this side they rob too much, that side they stab too much, 
or those kids fight too much.” (Focus group, young entrepreneurs, Khayelitsha, October 
2014). Any account of solidarity in Khayelitsha therefore has to take into account the 
conditions of danger in which residents are inscribed as part of daily experience. 
The sense of the danger and the fear that violence engenders is pervasive and forms 
a paradoxical thread of commonality through the social fabric in Khayelitsha. The 
context of violence, however is deeply ambiguous. What is revealed is the profoundly 
fluid relation of residents to violence, which includes both their victimisation through 
violence and sanction of violence. Accordingly, there are few fixed identities in relation 
to violence. This does not concern a moral failure or a “culture” of violence but rather 
an absence of objective conditions of “order” and sovereignty. This is a context in 
many ways of a “war of all against all”. This partly concerns the absence of policing as 
an agency which can “control the predatory violations of the conditions of coexistence 
among strangers” (Egon Bittner cited in Steinberg, 2011: 482).
In Khayelitsha the police do not exist in a space “above” the “war of all against all” but 
are part of it. The police instead are located in a horizontal rather than vertical relation to 
citizens. Instead of acting as the ultimate guarantors of law, they are deeply implicated 
in local networks of patronage and criminality and engage in a direct struggle for 
advantage with citizens. Thandi: “The law enforcers are killing us.” (Individual interview, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). Thus there is no dispassionate “rule of law” or Weberian 
bureaucracy to implement it. Citizens are denied impartial refuge or protection from 
predation. Interviewee 5: “We have nowhere to run.” (Focus group, older women, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). The law is personalized, unpredictable and networked. 
Nomvula: “Because I knew a detective there, he called me and told me that someone came 
here and laid a charge against me. The case just disappeared.” (Individual interview, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014).
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Furthermore, collective violence is aligned to a moral order of justice, punishment 
and discipline that disputes the norm and practice of an abstracted state law based 
on precedent and replicable rules that apply in all contexts. Here regimes of solidarity 
support a local regulatory system in which justice is profoundly contextual and collective, 
where punishment is personal, visceral and corporeal. Those who are identified as 
“criminals” may be subjected to violent public punishment. A former gang member 
explained, Interviewee 1: “[O]ur utmost fear is not going to jail or dying but it’s the torture 
by the community should they find you.” (Interview report, two former gang members, 
Khayelitsha, March 2014).
In this environment, an act of violence may or may not be constructed as a moral 
violation, as a subjectively understood violence. Thornton (1995) has argued violence 
is a profoundly ephemeral phenomenon, which we can in fact only know fully in 
retrospect. It is in retrospect that we construct narratives about violence. For example, 
violence against women is not subjectively constructed as violation among many young 
men, while for most residents, violence carried out against “criminals” and those seen to 
threaten social order is seldom problematised as a violation.
While Hobbes predicted a war of all against all in the absence of a sovereign Leviathan 
(cf Sorell & Foisneau, 2004), what emerges also in the absence of the meaningful 
sovereignty of the state and the vertical relations which this implies, is a deep 
horizontality and relationality between subjects existing in this space, where societal 
relations remain weakly mediated by the state and survival depends on reciprocity. 
The ethics of Ubuntu and communitarianism as a philosophy of social order pre-date 
both the colonial and apartheid states, while the post-apartheid state with its ambiguous 
invocation of both communitarianism and the individualism of Western modernity, tugs 
at this ethos in complex ways. In this context, the communitarian worldview remains 
a fundamental part of the social imaginary that, as Taylor argues, makes social life 
possible and constitutes the unquestioned assumptions and understandings about 
normative order and social practice.
The research in the township reveals a milieu of deep relationality, an ethics of solidarity and a 
multitude of concrete actions to substantiate this. Such relationality is a norm and necessity of 
daily life, an assumed part of human identity rather than the “choice” of the individual altruist 
working with like-minded neighbours as in Sampson et al’s (1997) conception of collective 
efficacy. John: “What is right about Khayelitsha is there is a community spirit.” (Individual 
interview, Khayelitsha, June 2014). A young women gave an example of this solidarity. 
Nomvula: “Yesterday, I got home and the whole house was painted. Everyone from my street 
was helping out. They left their homes and parked their problems to help with painting and 
moving furniture in the house.” (Individual interview, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
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If Sampson et al’s (1997: 919) evaluation of collective efficacy exists, “relative to the 
tasks of supervising children”, then collective care of the child is part of the norm of 
local sociality. Interviewee 5: “[T]he parent has been told by the community members 
that the child is knocking on death’s door.” (Focus group, older women, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014). A young woman orphaned at an early age explains the care her 
neighbours have given her since her mother’s death. Thandi: “My neighbours helped 
me in each and every step because they know the kind of child I am. They helped me here 
and there. They stood up for me. They love me and I love them.” (Individual interview, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Disputing the terms of the common good: “The thick book called democracy”
This is an environment where the trust and solidarity Sampson et al (1997) envisaged 
exists as part of the social fabric and subjective identity but it does not facilitate the 
realisation of “common values”. It instead undergirds fragile forms of reciprocity that 
are required in a context of imminent danger to life posed through violence, poverty and 
various forms of predation. The substantive terms of the common good are profoundly 
disputed, implicitly and explicitly refuting the state’s vision of the rule of law and a 
sociality founded on democratic norms and values. Instead authoritarian, extra-state 
collective forms of social ordering regulate social life in a setting where competing 
visions of “the ends that each has reason to value” may conflict in intractable terms 
around cleavages of class, gender, generation, neighbourhood, criminality, ethnicity, 
political affiliation, resources and other fluidly established sources of division.
Thus the Khayelitsha that emerges in the discourses of the young, the old, the male, 
the female, the trader, the foreign national, the young entrepreneur, the beneficiary 
of social development, the local politician, is not an objective “reality” but represents 
instead multiple co-joined constructions of this space, its order and ethics, the social 
relations inhered in it and its future possibilities. The geography of Khayelitsha, broken 
into blocks, zones, sites are symbolically constituted by residents as spaces of particular 
types of violence, particular types of deprivation, specific conditions of reciprocity. 
Below is an analysis of Khayelitsha as it is constituted in the imaginaries of three sets 
of focus group participants-older men, young men and young women. Clearly this can 
only be an extremely partial rendering of the space of Khayelitsha. The imaginaries that 
emerge in focus groups are in many ways the product of an artificial reconstruction 
of particular social groups. However, these momentary “snapshots” of social life and 
imagination do provide important insights into some of the ways in which Khayelitsha is 
constituted in space and subjectivity.
The vision of older men is deeply dystopian. Interviewee 6: “People no longer have 
Ubuntu.” (Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014), “I am trying to say that 
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living is not good anymore.” (Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). For 
them the space of Khayelitsha represents a wholesale overturning of order precipitated 
by the “thick book called democracy,” which has become “a reference for everything” 
(Interviewee 6: Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). For these men, 
democracy has not augured in a new emancipation through the ballot box but a 
new order of patronage: “The only people that benefit are those that bow down to the 
councillor.” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). Instead 
the introduction of democratic “politics” with “many parties” is seen as the cause of 
an escalated war of self-interest, of competition and self-aggrandisement: “Politics has 
made people look at each other with an evil eye.” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, older men, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014).
While these men, who grew up under the dispossession of apartheid, would appear 
to have much to gain from the new post-apartheid order, for them this order in fact 
represents a deep disorder, an overturning of gendered and generational hierarchies 
that they see as part of nature and God’s law. To oppose this order is to oppose nature 
itself. People, in the words of one interviewee, have become “birds” (Interviewee 
5: Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). This is not an emancipatory 
symbol, it represents a turning of “man” into an animal with freedoms unnatural to 
“his” condition. This overturning is most starkly represented in the recognition of the 
legitimacy of homosexuality by the Constitution: “In God’s creation no man marries 
another. That means the Constitution is against God.” (Interviewee 7: Focus group, older 
men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). The “rights of women and children” introduced by the 
Constitution, which was “drafted by people from other countries” (Interviewee 7: Focus 
group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014) has brought profound disorder into the 
heart of the social fabric and the natural hierarchy of family. Interviewee 3: “The law 
that says we are equal at home – between a man and woman – causes problems.” (Focus 
group, older men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). Now, “In the house there are two different 
laws. The wife has her laws and you have your laws. The children are in the middle. And 
that makes it impossible to unite.” (Interviewee 5: Focus group, older men, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014). All these overturnings appear to eclipse the abstractions of formal 
democracy, which have barely changed the empirical conditions of these men’s lives.
Young men who have grown up post-apartheid have a different imaginary. They do not 
judge the present in terms of the past. Their discourse is peppered with an urgency to 
be understood reflected in the constantly repeated phrase, “Do you understand?” They 
seem to be young people burdened with an enormous social weight as they recount 
the problems of Khayelitsha. Collective sighs of resignation and empathy follow each 
contribution about these challenges. Interviewee 3: “You won’t even understand 
because you find more young children in the community than those at school.” 
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Interviewee 2: Eish! [sigh]” (Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). And 
yet, stories of their own experiences of violence are generally greeted with laughter. These 
traumatic incidents become tales of daring do, of foes met and overcome, of bravery and 
bravado, “Had I shown them that I’m scared of them they would have took a chance and 
rob me. I just became strong … [All laughing] They placed me in between of them. They only 
asked me for money and I just said I don’t have it without even looking at them. [All laughing] 
(Interviewee 2: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Thus for these young men, as for most residents, the space of Khayelitsha is one of 
pervasive danger: “As for the crime, I don’t even want to talk about it. We take it as part of life.” 
(Interviewee 3: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). However, it is also 
a space of “fun”, Interviewee 3: “I would say we have fun every day.” (Focus group, young 
men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). These spaces of violence and fun are deeply implicated 
with one another. Spaces of recreation cannot be accessed as a result of violence. “If you 
want to play soccer you have to walk all the way to Makhaya. You might even get robbed.” 
(Interviewee 3: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). On the other hand, 
recreation spaces are seen as holding almost magical possibilities for the exclusion of 
violence. Recreation in the discourse of these young men carries an enormous symbolic 
weight and is seen as something that concerns not simply the question of leisure, as in 
middle-class forms of sociality, but a fundamental defence of life against the erosions of 
poverty, unemployment and failures of socialisation into “good citizenship” that these 
conditions precipitate. As one interviewee dreamed out loud: 
“Just imagine if you could run an overnight league that starts at six, seven, eight at 
night targeting the time people go to taverns. You might find out that 50% of the people 
that tend to go to taverns spend their time in the field. Robbers would spend their time 
in these facilities, but we don’t have them.” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young men, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Crime for these young men is seen as the consequence of the inability of the young 
to realise their human capital, their “talents” in a world where citizens are exhorted 
to “self-empowerment”, but where structural deprivation denies these possibilities: 
“Most of the boys who are robbers have many different talents. Just that they don’t 
have resources to showcase those talents.” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, young men, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). Thus in many ways these young men appear as the ideal 
“active” citizens whom the country’s development plans envisage as standing at the 
heart of a new South African economy and identity. Most are involved in various forms 
of community and political activity. They work to socialise other young people and 
children into norms of good citizenship: “We call ourselves ‘game changers’ where we 
try to give a positive attitude to children and also a good way of thinking and everything. 
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Do you understand?... I would say we are the servants of the community all in all.” 
(Interviewee 2: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
However, these young men’s subjectivities around violence are deeply ambiguous. 
And this concerns the conditions of disorder obtaining in the township, a context, 
in the absence of a state monopoly of the use of force, of sovereignty “unloosed”. As 
a result empirical “law” and “order” have to be negotiated and renegotiated daily and 
personally. The “community”, envisaged as a metaphorical object existing separately 
from them, is seen as being in a state of disunity and passivity: “Well from my area 
the community members are not working together. They don’t help each other at all.” 
(Interviewee 1: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). Part of the way 
in which this disunity is imagined is in terms of a failure to exercise violence that can 
putatively establish some momentary sovereignty over the constant conditions of 
violence and predation. These conditions are perpetrated, in the context of escalating 
gang violence by adolescent boys, conceived of as “children”: “There are children 
who are known that they are robbers and they rob every time.” (Interviewee 2: Focus 
group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). In this environment regimes of care 
and discipline become complex. The adage that a child is brought up the community 
means that as much as these children may receive collective care, they are vulnerable 
to collective violence. Women, however, do participate in these regimes of communal 
discipline, “if it’s another woman’s child who is beaten up she would be there too to watch 
or to beat too.” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014), 
but mothers who seek to protect their own children from violence are seen to inhibit 
legitimate processes of community punishment, “if the community members want to 
beat up the child who did wrong; their mothers wouldn’t let that happen.” (Interviewee 
1: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). In the imaginary of young men 
these principles of punishment constitute a normative order that is outside state and 
party: “In our generation it’s not even about political parties or organizations. If one of 
us guys gets robbed, he would come and tell me. We then work together and find out 
who did that and see what we do about him.” (Interviewee 2: Focus group, young men, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). State law and its associated normative regime literally exists 
in an alternative symbolic order. It is spoken in a foreign language, “[they] tell us about 
these English words saying that we are taking the law into our own hands” (Interviewee 1: 
Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014), and is imposed from the “outside”, 
“that is wrong because they say” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014 emphasis added).
What emerges in relation to the violence that women endure, is a contested imaginary 
in which the fact of this violence is denied by some and acknowledged by others. What 
is evident is that this realm of “private” violence is not easily articulated. When these 
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young men were asked about the treatment of women in the township, they collectively 
mumble until one interviewee argues that “Gender violence is very rare” (Interviewee 3: 
Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). While denying this violence, this 
interviewee unconsciously uses a term that has in the post-apartheid period come to 
name and acknowledge the invisible violence that women experience. Notwithstanding, 
two young men contested this perspective saying, “I think it’s hidden” (Interviewee 2: 
Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014), “there is a lot of violence, but you 
cannot see it.” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). 
For another young man, however, women as the property of men are the cause of male 
violence: “[T]he other thing I can say is that guys fight for women a lot. It’s rare to see 
a woman being abused by her man or boyfriend.” (Interviewee 5: Focus group, young 
men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). This hidden, unacknowledged violence nevertheless 
manifests in public displays, “seen” and watched but not censured: “In the evenings, 
when I walk in the street I would see someone hitting and questioning a woman, but I 
cannot stop it because you would find a group of people watching. I can’t make myself 
a hero when I’m just passing by and other people are watching.” (Interviewee 2: Focus 
group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014). This violence is understood to be the 
consequence of growing up in an environment saturated by violence against women: 
“We grew up seeing our fathers beating women so we also do that.” (Interviewee 1: Focus 
group, young men, Khayelitsha, October 2014 ).
Thus for young men, Khayelitsha is a space of violence in a double sense – they are both 
objects of and subjects of violence. Violence is inhered in the geography and their daily 
experience of Khayelitsha. Against this these young men seek to carve out places of 
peace through recreation and active citizenship. At the same time they are agents of 
violence sanctioned against the “children” who are seen to have overturned order in the 
township and women whose violation is refuted.
Young women have a different agential location in relation to the space of 
Khayelitsha. They appear to act far less on the space of Khayelitsha as opposed to 
in it. When they are asked about the community they tend to talk about conditions 
in terms of their own experience rather than about the community as an external 
object that needs to be acted on and corrected as do young men. One interviewee 
responded to a question about the resolution of conflict in the township: “For me 
resolving problems is about talking to a person or getting advice.” (Interviewee 2: 
Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). It is clear also that they 
experience Khayelitsha and their own condition as women as a deeply bounded 
space. They talk about being taken “out of” Khayelitsha (Interviewee 1: Focus 
group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014), of the “cage” (Interviewee 4: 
Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014) into which they must fit 
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as women. An interviewee asks where women must “run to” (Interviewee 4: Focus 
group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
The world of young women seems interior and self-referential. While they see 
social pathology around them, they emerge as the centre of moral responsibility. 
Their involvement in community activities primarily focuses on “learning” and self-
improvement. They seek to consciously create themselves as subjects within a regime 
of good citizenship modelled on an imaginary of empowerment. In this imaginary 
objective conditions of deprivation and violation become individual challenges of 
self-transformation. As one interviewee explained of the educational organisation in 
which she had been involved: “Hope did not teach us about HIV and AIDS, but how to live; 
how to accept your situation; how to get through your past and everything.” (Interviewee 
1: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). Therefore: “It depends on 
you. Tell yourself as you walk out the door that you are worth it. If yesterday was bad then 
tomorrow is going to be good.” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014). The context of poverty in which these young women live does not emerge 
as a direct object of discourse but tangentially in their discussion of the food that the 
empowerment programme “Hope” offers: “You knew that you would arrive there and get 
food.” (Interviewee 2: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
These young women appear as agents of networks and solidarities, almost exclusively 
between women. Friendships, relationships and their location in this community of 
networks is at the centre of their discourse. There is a concern with the reciprocity of 
neighbouring: “If you support your community then your community will support you. If 
you don’t care or attend other people’s events no one will attend yours.” (Interviewee 
2: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). The nature of networks is 
closely related to imaginaries of local space. Litha Park, a more affluent area where the 
reciprocity required by extreme need is not as stark, is seen by those living outside it as 
a place where there is an absence of sociality, as “[p]eople kept to themselves and did 
not make friends” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 
2014), and as a place of inauthenticity, “[t]here a person is full of oneself and yet they 
are hungry” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014), 
but is constructed differently by those inside the space. One interviewee who lives 
in Litha Park explained: “They say we are stuck up which is not true. We want to talk to 
people.” (Interviewee 2: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Entanglement in networks of friendship within local spaces means that “reputation” 
and face are particularly important. Gossip and rumour are the enemies of good face: 
“I am who I am and won’t tell anyone my problem because they will gossip about me.” 
(Interviewee 1: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). Nevertheless, 
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there is a concern with the reparation of relations and a language of humbling that 
does not appear in male discourse. Interviewee 3: “The important thing when you 
stay with people is to humble yourself and ask for forgiveness even if you are not wrong” 
(Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Men appear to exist outside these networks of friendship and gossip and enter 
women’s worlds and imagination as emotional and physical predators: “You know 
that your boyfriend will overpower you. Our boyfriends beat us.” (Interviewee 1: 
Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). “The worst form of abuse is 
emotional … you will cry and forgive him.” (Interviewee 2: Focus group, young women, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). Vulnerability to violation comes from the condition of 
womanhood, which is, as one interviewee explained, personified by the interiority of 
the heart rather than exterior action and the mind: “Women have one heart. A man 
has a brain and fitness.” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014). Women instead have “beauty”, which they can use to symbolically “kill” 
the male “beast” (Interviewee 5: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 
2014). These regimes of power are inhered in the landscape of Khayelitsha where 
women are constituted as property. Interviewee 1: “As girls we encounter challenges 
with the boys that we grow up with. If you don’t date one of those boys and date a boy 
from another place they label you as a slut.” (Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014). Women use their relationships with men instrumentally to negotiate 
the privations of poverty. This gives them some power but makes them vulnerable 
to abuse: “You cannot dump him even if he beats you or cheats on you because he will 
give you money. Money makes us settle.” (Interviewee 1: Focus group, young women, 
Khayelitsha, October 2014). The neighbourhood imagined in relation to men is a place 
of deep unsafety: “We are not safe outside, with boyfriends and everywhere, even at 
work.” (Interviewee 5: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). 
It is a place of pervasive predation by the stepfather, the pastor who “looks at you 
funny” (Interviewee 4: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014), the 
male neighbour, as “you are scared to go ask for sugar at the neighbour’s house … the 
man will be looking at you” (Interviewee 5: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, 
October 2014), and the police: “They all touch us. When the police officer changes the 
gear he touches your thighs. He will tell you not to cry and everything will be alright.” 
(Interviewee 2: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
In this context of pervasive danger and absence of policing, “[n]o community 
member goes to the police station if they get robbed …” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, 
young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014), and young women accept violence as 
part of a regime of local punishment and control. They express support for the taxi 
associations that play a key role in enacting these violent forms of social ordering: 
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“All misbehaving people fear taxi drivers because they beat people.” (Interviewee 
1: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). They explain how the 
space of Khayelitsha defines the boundaries of legitimate punishment: “They will 
never allow people from Litha Park to go beat people in Harare. That I am sure of.” 
(Interviewee 5: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). They 
share the perspective of young men that mothers undermine the possibility of 
order by seeking to protect their children from collective punishment: “The mothers 
in Litha Park did not permit that. The mothers in Harare also did not permit that.” 
(Interviewee 5: Focus group, young women, Khayelitsha, October 2014). The police, 
when applying state law that makes these forms of violence illegal are perceived 
to be protecting the legitimate objects of community violence: “The police take 
the skollies when the community beat them.” (Interviewee 3: Focus group, young 
women, Khayelitsha, October 2014).
Thus Khayelitsha emerges as a deeply complex space in the imaginaries of young 
women, it is both a “cage” and a place where hope, friendship and empowerment can 
be found. It is a place to nurture relationships but is it is also a space of pervasive male 
predation and violence. It is a space of absence of law and an imaginary of punishment 
that can putatively restore order through violence.
Conclusion
How then, does this brief review of neighbourhood discourses and practice speak 
to conceptions of social cohesion formulated in the global north and integrated 
into national South African policy discourse? The material presented here evokes 
a profoundly different sociality to that imagined by Putnam (2000) and Sampson 
et al (1997), one in which violence and reciprocity are deeply intertwined in 
social practice and imagination. This is a consequence of both an ethical order of 
communitarianism as well as objective conditions of deprivation and absence of 
the type of state sovereignty and care that could create the conditions for a “good 
life”. Therefore, the analysis points to the need to fundamentally reconceptualise 
our understanding of social cohesion and collective efficacy, not simply to tweak 
them in order to take into account the habitus of subjects outside the “north” but 
to fundamentally question some of the premises on which these conceptions of 
social life are constructed. Social cohesion as a concept relates to a foundational 
concern about the constitution of the social fabric and the terms on which enough 
solidarity may be maintained to prevent a “war of all against all”. The way in which it 
has been interpreted however evokes the conditions of the global north. Durkheim’s 
investigation of the fragmenting effects of industrialisation took place at a time 
when the devastating effects of colonialism were causing problems of division and 
difference of a different order on the African continent.
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Its evocation in the 1990s in major global institutions spoke to the concerns of 
nation-states whose established “imaginary” of nationhood was seen to be under 
threat of dissolution by unregulated flows of difference across national borders. 
In its own instrumentalisation of the concept, the South African state has sought to deploy 
the idea to urge social compacts across divisions for the ends of the developmental 
state. At the same time it has attempted to indigenise the concept by bringing to 
bear the local ethics of Ubuntu to its conception of the grounds of solidarity in the 
post-apartheid nation-state. More recently, it has tried to meld the ethic of Ubuntu to a 
vision of citizenship founded on an entirely different ethics, that of the “secular rational”, 
the individual and rights based civic norms of law and Constitution.
The fieldwork shows the paradoxes of this vision played out at a local level between 
citizens and between citizens and the state. It shows a context where there is indeed 
a deep ethics of solidarity as formulated in the state’s conception of Ubuntu. This 
undergirds acts of solidarity that help citizens survive and share resources for friendship 
and sociability.
At the same time these norms of reciprocity often directly dispute law and support 
public expressions of sovereign violence that reflect not only the absence of the state 
but the assertion of a moral and ethical paradigm based on the will of the collective. 
This is underpinned by an ethics of communitarianism that privileges community 
above the individual and melds the common and the good. This ethics runs 
significantly counter to the rights based individualism articulated in the Constitution. 
In contrast to the state’s assertion of civic nationalism founded on the norm of law as 
the basis for solidarity, in Khayelitsha the law of the Constitution appears distant if not 
suspended and does not have meaningful empirical traction as a resource structuring 
daily life. The most immediate face of law, the police, instead represent a source of 
contamination and violation.
While Sampson et al (1997) see collective efficacy as being created by collective action for 
the common good, here collective action is the norm but the substantive grounds of the 
common good in the new democracy are profoundly contested. Democracy has brought 
new imaginaries of living and sources of authority to bear in ways that confound previous 
hierarchies and commonalities. Visions of the good jostle for realisation and priority. The 
analysis of the discourse of residents in Khayelitsha begins to show how this space is 
constituted in terms of a variety of imaginations of the nature of the post-apartheid 
condition, its moral order, its norms, its violations and its possibilities for hope. These 
are malleably constructed in the discourse of different generations and genders. While 
the end of apartheid is globally and nationally imagined as the ground zero of a new 
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sociality and a new emancipatory order, men who grew up under apartheid see the 
current order of rights as an unsupportable overturning of natural law. Democracy, for 
them, has inaugurated an era of competitive self-interest rather a representation of the 
common good whose Constitutional terms they dispute. They appear to stand outside 
the social order, angry onlookers to the contemporary world. Moreover, young men and 
young women are deeply engaged in the work of post-apartheid citizenship, actively 
seeking to shape themselves and their peers in terms of norms of empowerment that 
are internalised as part of both a local and global imaginary of good citizenship in the 
neoliberal era. They battle against the conditions of structural deprivation in which 
they are located to realise these imaginaries of transformation. However, what these 
conditions of transformation might be are deeply divided between genders. Khayelitsha 
as it emerges in the discourse of young women is one of pervasive predation and violence 
that shapes all spaces from the most intimate to the most external. The position of 
young women within the social order of Khayelitsha refutes the imaginaries of disorder 
and rights in older men’s discourse. At the same time young men dispute the very reality 
of the violence that women experience.
What appears most common in the discourses of residents are the conditions of violence 
and the absence of a state monopoly over the means of violence. The bare violence to 
which residents are consequently exposed is inscribed in space and subjectivity. The 
restoration of order is collectively imagined in terms of regime of violent communal 
punishment that seeks to establish the terms of a normative order that the state is as yet 
unable to establish either imaginatively or physically.
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